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How do things come to be owned? This is a fundamental puz-
zle for anyone who thinks about property. One buys things from
other owners, to be sure, but how did the other owners get those
things? Any chain of ownership or title must have a first link.
Someone had to do something to anchor that link. The law tells us
what steps we must follow to obtain ownership of things, but we
need a theory that tells us why these steps should do the job.
John Locke's view, once described as "the standard bourgeois
theory,"1 is probably the one most familiar to American students.
Locke argued that an original owner is one who mixes his or her
labor with a thing and, by commingling that labor with the thing,
establishes ownership of it.' This labor theory is appealing because
it appears to rest on "desert,"3 but it has some problems. First,
without a prior theory of ownership, it is not self-evident that one
owns even the labor that is mixed with something else.4 Second,
even if one does own the labor that one performs, the labor theory
provides no guidance in determining the scope of the right that
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exertions. See J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 27, at 329, § 28, at 330. Richard Epstein argues that
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one establishes by mixing one's labor with something else. Robert
Nozick illustrates this problem with a clever hypothetical. Suppose
I pour a can of tomato juice into the ocean: do I now own the
seas?5
A number of thinkers more or less contemporary to Locke pro-
posed another theory of the basis of ownership. According to this
theory, the original owner got title through the consent of the rest
of humanity (who were, taken together, the first recipients from
God, the genuine original owner).' Locke himself identified the
problems with this theory; they involve what modern law-and-eco-
nomics writers would call "administrative costs." How does every-
one get together to consent to the division of things among
individuals?
7
The common law has a third approach, which shares some
characteristics with the labor and consent theories but is distinct
enough to warrant a different label. For the common law, posses-
sion or "occupancy" is the origin of property." This notion runs
through a number of fascinating old cases with which teachers of
5 ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974). The example rests on the
argument that Locke's labor theory of property means that one acquires property by mixing
what one owns (one's labor) with what one does not own. Nozick substitutes the can of
tomato juice for one's labor.
See, e.g., HuGo GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. 2, ch. 2, 1, 4-5 (Kelsey
trans. 1925) (1st ed. Amsterdam 1646); J. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 327-28, editor's note to
lines 18-21; see also id. at 114, editor's introduction. For Blackstone's brief discussion of the
conflicts among natural law theorists over labor and consent theories, see 2 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *8 ("A dispute that savours too much of
nice and scholastic refinement!").
7 See J. LocKE, supra note 2, § 28, at 330 ("If such a consent as that [of all humanity
for individual gathering of wild acorns or apples] was necessary, Man had starved, notwith-
standing the Plenty God had given him."); see also id. § 29, at 331 (requiring explicit con-
sent would result in prohibitive costs of allocating "to everyone his particular part"). Robert
Filmer, against whose work Locke directed his Treatises, had also noted this problem. See
the edition of Filmer's Patriarcha in JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT
249-308 (T. Cook ed. 1947). A possible answer is that consent takes the passive or negative
form of acquiescence: humanity might be viewed as consenting to those individual claims to
which no one objects. See SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, LE DROIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENS liv.
4, ch. 4, § 9 (J. Barbeyrac trans. 5th ed. 1734) (1st ed. Lund 1672). It is possible to read
Locke's property theory in this light, and indeed such a reading might resolve the contradic-
tion between his stated views that (1) God gave the world to all mankind in common, but
(2) all mankind need not consent to individual appropriation. J. LocKE, supra note 2, § 25,
at 327; cf. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *8 (interpreting Locke as disputing the implied
as well as the express consent theory).
8 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *8. Richard Epstein notes some ways in which the
doctrine of first possession differs from a labor theory. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1225-
26. He also distinguishes the possession doctrine from a theory of property based on custom
and common practice. Id. at 1234-35. My view is that a custom theory is a version of the
theory of universal consent.
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property law love to challenge their students. Such inquiries into
the acquisition of title to wild animals and abandoned treasure
may seem purely academic; how often, after all, do we expect to
get into disputes about the ownership of wild pigs or long-buried
pieces of eight? These cases are not entirely silly, though. People
still do find treasure-laden vessels,' and statesmen do have to con-
sider whether someone's acts might support a claim to own the
moon, for example, or the mineral nodes at the bottom of the sea.10
Moreover, analogies to the capture of wild animals show up time
and again when courts have to deal on a nonstatutory basis with
some "fugitive" resource that is being reduced to property for the
first time, such as oil,1 gas, groundwater,13 or space on the spec-
trum of radio frequencies.
4
With these more serious claims in mind, then, I turn to the
maxim of the common law: first possession is the root of title.
Merely to state the proposition is to raise two critical questions:
what counts as possession, and why is it the basis for a claim to
title?15 In exploring the quaint old cases' answers to these ques-
' See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
10 For the history and theory of the "global common," including the high seas, the polar
regions, and outer space, see ALEXANDRA M POST, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
ch. 6 (1983).
"* See, e.g., Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379, 44 A. 1074 (1899).
12 See, e.g., Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 239, 18
A. 724, 725 (1889).
Is Louisiana courts have viewed percolating groundwater as unowned until "captured."
See Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. App.), cert. refused 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d
880 (1963). Some other states have followed the "English Rule" of Acton v. Blundell, 12
Mees & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843) (treating groundwater as a part of the prop-
erty of the landowner, who can take as much as he likes so long as the use is neither wanton
nor malicious). See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292-93, 276
S.W.2d 798, 801 (1955); Houston & T.C. Ry. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 151, 81 S.W. 279, 281-82
(1904). This rule may in fact not differ greatly from a rule of capture or first possession,
since an owner cannot complain of loss of his water if it "escapes" to and is "captured" by a
neighbor. Other states treat property in percolating groundwater under an "American" doc-
trine that limits the rights to "capture" subsurface water to such "reasonable use" as is
compatible with the reasonable use of other owners. See Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43
N.H. 569, 577-78 (1862); Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 526, 58 N.E. 644, 645-46
(1900).
14 Cf. Rowley, Problems in the Law of Radio Communication, 1 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 27-31
(1927) (disputing the applicability to radio frequencies of the analogy to capture of wild
animals).
15 Professor Epstein discusses the doctrine of possession from a perspective rather dif-
ferent from that presented here; he views the question of what counts as "possession" as the
"little question," and concentrates instead on the "big question," viz., why possession counts
as a basis of title at all. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1225. Without going into the big/little
issue, my view is that one cannot meaningfully ask why possession is a root of title unless
1985]
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tions, we hit on some fundamental views about the nature and pur-
poses of a property regime.
Consider Pierson v. Post,1 a classic wild-animal case from the
early nineteenth century. Post was hunting a fox one day on an
abandoned beach and almost had the beast in his gunsight when
an interloper appeared, killed the fox, and ran off with the carcass.
The indignant Post sued the interloper for the value of the fox on
the theory that his pursuit of the fox had established his property
right to it.
The court disagreed. It cited a long list of learned authorities
to the effect that "occupancy" or "possession" went to the one who
killed the animal, or who at least wounded it mortally or caught it
in a net. These acts brought the animal within the "certain con-
trol" that gives rise to possession and hence a claim to ownership.17
Possession thus means a clear act, whereby all the world un-
derstands that the pursuer has "an unequivocal intention of appro-
priating the animal to his individual use."' 8 A clear rule of this sort
should be applied, said the court, because it prevents confusion
and quarreling among hunters (and coincidentally makes the
judges' task easier when hunters do get into quarrels).
The dissenting judge commented that the best way to handle
this matter would be to leave it to a panel of sportsmen, 9 who
presumably would have ruled against the interloper. In any event,
he noted that the majority's rule would discourage the useful activ-
ity of fox hunting: who would bother to go to all the trouble of
keeping dogs and chasing foxes if the reward were up for grabs to
any "saucy intruder"?20 If we really want to see that foxes don't
overrun the countryside, we will allocate a property right-and
thus the ultimate reward-to the hunter at an earlier moment, so
that he will undertake the useful investment in keeping hounds
and the useful labor in flushing the fox.
The problem with assigning "possession" prior to the kill is, of
course, that we need a principle to tell us when to assign it. Shall
we assign it when the hunt begins? When the hunter assembles his
one has some idea of what is meant by "possession." Epstein does, I believe, have an un-
stated idea of what is meant by possession; the purpose of the present article is to make
such ideas more explicit.
" 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
11 Id. at 178.
Is Id.
19 Id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 181.
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dogs for the hunt? When the hunter buys his dogs?21
Pierson thus presents two great principles, seemingly at odds,
for defining possession: (1) notice to the world through a clear act,
and (2) reward to useful labor. The latter principle, of course, sug-
gests a labor theory of property. The owner gets the prize when he
"mixes in his labor" by hunting. On the other hand, the former
principle suggests at least a weak form of the consent theory: the
community requires clear acts so that it has the opportunity to dis-
pute claims, but may be thought to acquiesce in individual owner-
ship where the claim is clear and no objection is made.2
On closer examination, however, the two positions do not seem
so far apart. In Pierson, each side acknowledged the importance of
the other's principle. Although the majority decided in favor of a
clear rule, it tacitly conceded the value of rewarding useful labor.
Its rule for possession would in fact reward the original hunter
most of the time, unless we suppose that the woods are thick with
"saucy intruders." On the other side, the dissenting judge also
wanted some definiteness in the rule of possession. He was simply
insisting that the acts that sufficed to give notice should be pre-
scribed by the relevant community, namely hunters or
"sportsmen." Perhaps, then, there is some way to reconcile the
clear-act and reward-to-labor principles.
The clear-act principle suggests that the common law defines
acts of possession as some kind of statement. As Blackstone said,
the acts must be a declaration of one's intent to appropriate."
This possibility is illustrated in a later nineteenth-century case in-
volving possession of land. Brumagim v. Bradshaw24 involved two
claimants to a considerable amount of land that had become, by
the time the litigation was brought, the residential and commercial
Potrero district of San Francisco. Each party claimed ownership of
the land through a title extending back to an original "possessor"
of the land, and the issue was whether the first of these purported
possessors, one George Treat, had really "possessed" the land at
21 For a similar problem concerning ownership of oil and gas, having to do with uncer-
tainties about the point at which to attribute "possession" to one who claims a fugitive
resource, compare Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 689, 75 S.W.2d
204, 206 (1934) (gas withdrawn from earth and then pumped back for storage is comparable
to animal returned to wild and may thus be tapped by a neighbor), with Westmoreland &
Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 250, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889) (oil and gas in
the ground are "possessed" if all equipment is in place to tap at any time).
22 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
22 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *9, *258.
2' 39 Cal. 24 (1870).
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all. If he had not, his successors in interest could not claim owner-
ship through him, and title would go to those claiming through a
later "first possessor."
Those who claimed through Treat put a number of facts
before the jury to establish his original possession. They noted par-
ticularly that Treat had repaired a fence across the neck of the
Potrero peninsula-to which the other side rejoined that outsiders
could still land in boats, and that, in any event, there was a gap in
the fence. 25 The Treat claimants also alleged that Treat had made
use of the land by pasturing livestock on it-though the other side
argued that the land had not been suitable for cattle even then,
because San Francisco was expanding in that direction. 28 The court
ruled that the jury should decide whether Treat's acts gave suffi-
cient notice to the public that he had appropriated the property.
2 7
If so, he had "possessed" it and could pass it on as an owner.
This instruction would seem to come down clearly on the side
of the "clear act" theory of possession. Yet that theory seems to
leave out some elements of the evidence. The fence question, to be
sure, bore on whether Treat's acts informed the public of his claim.
But the parties' arguments over whether Treat's use was "suitable"
seemed to reflect concern over an aim of rewarding useful labor. If
suitable use were a relevant issue, why did the court's jury instruc-
tion ignore the value of rewarding labor?
The answer to this question may well be that suitable use is
also a form of notice. If outsiders would think that a large area
near a growing city was abandoned because it was vacant except
for a few cows, they might enter on the land and claim some prime
waterfront footage for themselves. In other words, if the use that
Treat made was unsuitable, his use would not give notice of his
claim to others. Thus, to ask whether Treat used the land suitably
is just another way of asking whether he informed others of his
claim, particularly those others who might have been interested in
buying the land from Treat or settling it for themselves. Society is
worst off in a world of vague claims; if no one knows whether he
can safely use the land, or from whom he should buy it if it is
already claimed, the land may end up being used by too many peo-
ple or by none at all.
Possession now begins to look even more like something that
requires a kind of communication, and the original claim to the
25 Id. at 30.
26 Id. at 41-42.
27 Id. at 51.
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property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed
of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in
question. Moreover, some venerable statutory law obligates the ac-
quiring party to keep on speaking, lest he lose his title by "adverse
possession."
Adverse possession is a common law interpretation of statutes
of limitation for actions to recover real property.28 Suppose I own a
lot in the mountains, and some stranger to me, without my permis-
sion, builds a house on it, clears the woods, and farms the lot con-
tinuously for a given period, say twenty years. During that time, I
am entitled to go to court to force him off the lot. But if I have not
done so at the end of twenty years, or some other period fixed by
statute, not only can I not sue him for recovery of what was my
land, but the law recognizes him as the title owner.2 9 The doctrine
of adverse possession thus operates to transfer property to one who
is initially a trespasser if the trespasser's presence is open to every-
one, lasts continuously for a given period of time, and if the title
owner takes no action to get rid of him during that time.
Here again we seem to have an example of a reward to the
useful laborer at the expense of the sluggard. But the doctrine is
susceptible to another interpretation as well; it might be designed,
not to reward the useful laborer, but to require the owner to assert
her right publicly. It requires her to make it clear that she, and not
the trespasser, is the person to deal with if anyone should wish to
buy the property or use some portion of it.
Courts have devoted much attention to the elements of a suc-
cessful claim of adverse possession. Is grazing livestock a continu-
ous use, so as to entitle the livestock owner to claim full ownership
of the pasture as an adverse possessor? 30 How about farming
(where intensive use may be merely seasonal) or taking care of a
lawn? 31 Is a cave that encroaches deep under my land something
that is obvious to me, so that I should be required to kick out the
trespasser who operates it as a commercial attraction?32 No matter
" 7 RICHARD POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1012 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1984).
20 Id. 1025; Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 141 (1918).
30 See, e.g., Halsey v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 66 S.W.2d 1082, 1087 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) (yes, even though the cattle had to be removed when a nearby river flooded); cf. Mc-
Shan v. Pitts, 554 S.W.2d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (no, at least when the grazing
was merely "casual" and was not so intense as to reach the limits of the pasture's capacity).
31 See Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216 N.Y. 362, 372-73, 110 N.E. 772, 776 (1915) (cut-
ting grass may establish "cultivation" that establishes adverse possession claim under New
York statute).
32 See Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937) (occupying claim-
ant does not acquire title to that portion of cave underlying surface titleholder's property
19851
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how much the doctrine of adverse possession seems to reward the
one who performs useful labor on land at the expense of the lazy
owner who does nothing, the crucial element in all these situations
is, once again, communication. "Possession" means acts that "'ap-
prise the community[,] . . arrest attention, and put others claim-
ing title upon inquiry.'-"8
In Illinois, for example, an adverse possessor may establish his
claim merely by paying taxes on the property, at least against an
owner who is familiar with real estate practice and records.3 4 Why
is this? Naturally the community likes to have taxes paid and is
favorably disposed toward one who pays them. But more impor-
tant, payment of taxes is a matter of public record, and the owner
whose taxes are paid by someone else should be aware that some-
thing peculiar is happening. 5 Just as important, the public is very
likely to view the taxpayer as the owner. If someone is paying taxes
on my vacant lot or empty house, any third person who wants to
buy the house is very likely to think that the taxpayer is the owner
because people do not ordinarily pay taxes on land they do not
own. If I want to keep my land, the burden is upon me to correct
the misimpression. The possibility of transferring titles through
adverse possession once again serves to ensure that members of the
public can rely upon their own reasonable perceptions, and an
owner who fails to correct misleading appearances may find his ti-
tle lost to one who speaks loudly and clearly, though erroneously.
because occupancy was not open and notorious).
33 Slatin's Properties, Inc. v. Hassler, 53 Ill. 2d 325, 329, 291 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1972)
(quoting Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Drobnick, 20 IM. 2d 374, 379, 169 N.E.2d 792, 796
(1960)).
31 Slatin's Properties, Inc. v. Hassler, 53 Ill. 2d 325, 331, 291 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1972); see
also Limitations Act § 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-110 (1983) (legal title to vacant land
established by paying taxes in good faith for seven years). In some western states, no ad-
verse possession claims are allowed unless taxes are paid and recorded. See Comment, Pay-
ment of Taxes as a Condition of Title by Adverse Possession: A Nineteenth Century
Anachronism, 9 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 244, 244 (1969). This was designed to protect the
railroads, who could not police their vast holdings and needed notice through the assessors'
offices. Id. at 248-49. Such a rule again suggests the communicative aspect of adverse posses-
sion: claims ought not run against those who are incapable of "hearing" the message given
by the would-be adverse possessor. The same may be said of the classes of owners, men-
tioned infra note 35, whose properties are normally treated as immune from adverse posses-
sion claims.
35 An owner who is unlikely to notice such an oddity may be exempt from adverse
possession claims. These claims normally do not run against mental incompetents or chil-
dren or certain other "disabled" owners who might be thought unable to perceive or act on
events that would constitute notice to ordinary adults. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:14-32
(1952) (owners who are out of the country are immune); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.04
(Page 1981) (includes prisoners among the "disabled").
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Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to
amount to something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be
interested. The first to say, "This is mine," in a way that the pub-
lic understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it
against someone else who says, "No, it is mine." But if the original
communicator dallies too long and allows the public to believe the
interloper, he will find that the interloper has stepped into his
shoes and has become the owner.
Similar ideas of the importance of communication, or as it is
more commonly called, "notice," are implicit in our recording stat-
utes and in a variety of other devices that force a property claim-
ant to make a public record of her claims on pain of losing them
altogether."' Indeed, notice plays a part in the most mundane
property-like claims to things that the law does not even recognize
as capable of being reduced to ownership. "Would you please save
my place?" one says to one's neighbor in the movie line, in order to
ensure that others in line know that one is coming back and not
relinquishing one's claim.37 In my home town of Chicago, one may
choose to shovel the snow from a parking place on the street, but
in order to establish a claim to it one must put a chair or some
other object in the cleared space. 8 The useful act of shoveling
snow does not speak as unambiguously as the presence of an object
that blocks entry.
Why, then, is it so important that property owners make and
keep their communications clear? Economists have an answer:
clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict.
If I am careless about who comes on to a corner of my property, I
invite others to make mistakes and to waste their labor on im-
provements to what I have allowed them to think is theirs. I thus
invite a free-for-all over my ambiguously held claims, and I en-
courage contention, insecurity, and litigation-all of which waste
36 For a recording statute that recognizes only those real-property claims that have
been recorded, see N.C.-GEN. STAT. § 47-18(a) (1976). For the United States' efforts to re-
quire that holders of inchoate claims on public mineral lands record their claims, on pain of
losing them, see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 314, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1744(c) (1982). For a discussion of marketable-title statutes, which extinguish stale land
claims except insofar as the claimants file notice of the claim, see Barnett, Marketable Title
Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1967).
37 For notice elements in claims to places in line, see On the Pressures and Politics of
Waiting in Line, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982, at C1, C7, col. 1 (claims staked by "saving
places" and leaving objects; one entrepreneur distributes numbered tickets for places in the
standing-room line at the opera).
38 See Chicago Tribune, Jan. 27, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 1 (picture of chairs placed in shov-
eled parking spaces).
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everyone's time and energy and may result in overuse or underuse
of resources. But if I keep my property claims clear, others will
know that they should deal with me directly if they want to use my
property. We can bargain rather than fight; through trade, all
items will come to rest in the hands of those who value them most.
If property lines are clear, then, anyone who can make better use
of my property than I can will buy or rent it from me and turn the
property to his better use. In short, we will all be richer when
property claims are unequivocal, because that unequivocal status
enables property to be traded and used at its highest value. 9
Thus, it turns out that the common law of first possession, in
rewarding the one who communicates a claim, does reward useful
labor; the useful labor is the very act of speaking clearly and dis-
tinctly about one's claims to property. Naturally, this must be in a
language that is understood, and the acts of "possession" that
communicate a claim will vary according to the audience. Thus,
returning to Pierson v. Post, the dissenting judge may well have
thought that fox hunters were the only relevant audience for a
claim to the fox; they are the only ones who have regular contact
with the subject matter. By the same token, the mid-nineteenth-
century California courts gave much deference to the mining-camp
customs in adjudicating various Gold Rush claims; the Forty-
Niners themselves, as those most closely involved with the subject,
could best communicate and interpret the signs of property claims
and would be particularly well served by a stable system of sym-
bols that would enable them to avoid disputes.4 °
The point, then, is that "acts of possession" are, in the now
fashionable term, a "text," and that the common law rewards the
author of that text. But, as students of hermeneutics know, the
39 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 27-31 (2d ed. 1977). For critiques
of this analysis, see Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 711, 717-20 (1980); Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, 24
NoMos 3 (1982); for critiques of these two articles, respectively, see Baker, Starting Points
in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939, 957-65 (1980); Demsetz, Professor
Michelman's Unnecessary and Futile Search for the Philosopher's Touchstone, 24 NoMos
41 (1982).
40 See McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California,
1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth-Century America,
10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 235, 239-41 (1976). McCurdy also notes, however, that there were
implicit conflicts between first arrivals and latecomers to the mining areas and that the
courts had to devise rules for deciding cases where one or the other group attempted to
change mining-district rules to its own advantage. Id. at 242-46; cf. Umbeck, A Theory of
Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 JJL. & EcoN. 421, 422-28 (1977) (eco-
nomic analysis of the types of claim agreements made by miners).
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clearest text may have ambiguous subtexts.41 In connection with
the text of first possession, there are several subtexts that are espe-
cially worthy of note. One is the implication that the text will be
"read" by the relevant audience at the appropriate time. It is not
always easy to establish a symbolic structure in which the text of
first possession can be "published" at such a time as to be useful to
anyone. Once again, Pierson v. Post illustrates the problem that
occurs when a clear sign (killing the fox) comes only relatively late
in the game, after the relevant parties may have already expended
overlapping efforts and embroiled themselves in a dispute. Very
similar problems occurred in the whaling industry in the nine-
teenth century: the courts expended a considerable amount of
mental energy in finding signs of "possession" that were compre-
hensible to whalers from their own customs and that at the same
time came early enough in the chase to allow the parties to avoid
wasted efforts and the ensuing mutual recriminations.
42
Some objects of property claims do seem inherently incapable
of clear demarcation-ideas, for example.43 In order to establish
ownership of such disembodied items we find it necessary to trans-
late the property claims into sets of secondary symbols that our
culture understands. In patent and copyright law, for example, one
establishes an entitlement to the expression of an idea by translat-
ing it into a written document and going through a registration
process-though the unending litigation over ownership of these
expressions, and over which expressions can even be subject to pat-
ent or copyright, might lead us to conclude that these particular
secondary symbolic systems do not always yield widely understood
"markings. ' 44 We also make up secondary symbols for physical ob-
41 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 29 (1980).
42 See, e.g., Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696); Aberdeen
Arctic Co. v. Sutter, 149 Rev. Rep. 358 (H.L. 1862) (Scot.); Hogarth v. Jackson, 2 Car. & P.
595, 172 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B. 1827); Fennings v. Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241, 127 Eng. Rep. 825
(C.P. 1808).
43 See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2356-58, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 230-31 (K.B.
1769) (Yates, J., dissenting) (mere ideas, being incorporeal, cannot be subject to possession
or ownership); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 672-73 (1834) (Thompson, J., dis-
senting) (same).
44 For an extreme example of the failure of the copyright system to give clear notice of
ownership of songs, see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), in which the court,
in an opinion by Judge Frank, held that the author of "The Lord Is My Shepherd" was
entitled to a trial on the merits of whether Cole Porter's "Begin the Beguine" infringed his
copyright! Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (computer operating system software may be
copyrighted). In the case of computer software, it has been suggested that the invention
might better have been handled as a patent, except that the lead time for patents is so long
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jects that would seem to be much easier to mark out than ideas;
even property claims in land, that most tangible of things, are now
at their most authoritative in the form of written records.45
It is expensive to establish and maintain these elaborate struc-
tures of secondary symbols, as indeed it may be expensive to estab-
lish a structure of primary symbols of possession. The economists
have once again performed a useful service in pointing out that
there are costs entailed in establishing any property system.46
These costs might prevent the development of any system at all for
some objects, where our need for secure investment and trade is
not as great as the cost of creating the necessary symbols of
possession.
There is a second and perhaps even more important subtext to
the "text" of first possession: the tacit supposition that there is
such a thing as a "clear act," unequivocally proclaiming to the uni-
verse one's appropriation-that there are in fact unequivocal acts
of possession, which any relevant audience will naturally and easily
interpret as property claims. Literary theorists have recently writ-
ten a great deal about the relativity of texts. They have written too
much for us to accept uncritically the idea that a "text" about
property has a natural meaning independent of some audience
constituting an "interpretive community" 47 or independent of a
range of other "texts" and cultural artifacts that together form a
symbolic system in which a given text must be read.48 It is not
that it would make the "property" right useless in such a rapidly changing field-hence the
choice of the more rapid copyright system. See Sanger, The Gavel Comes Down on Com-
puter Copycats, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 3, at 8, col. 1. The Apple Computer analysis
further suggests that secondary systems for establishing rights in "uncatchable" property
may not be immune from the disputes and overlapping use that often accompany unclear
property claims. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the Ameri-
can West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 168-78 (1975) (property-rights systems for Western land,
livestock, and water were developed only when the benefits of such systems overcame the
administrative costs of establishing them); Umbeck, supra note 40, at 421-28 (choice of
property system subject to constraint of transaction costs); see also Michelman, supra note
39, at 30-31 (private property is a type of regulatory system).
"' See TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 74-88 (1983) (meaning of a text is indeter-
minable unless readers share common understanding of its elements); S. FISH, supra note 41,
at 239-44 (communication requires agreed-upon language conventions).
48 See, e.g., T. EAGLETON, supra note 47, ch. 4 (all literary texts are "woven out of" prior
and contemporaneous elements). Some of these authors regard the meaning of any text as
radically unstable, since all texts may be said to depend on all others for proper understand-
ing: no one writes upon a slate that is even remotely clean. See, e.g. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS,
DECONSTRUCrION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 24-32 (1982) (elements of language and texts take
their meanings by reference to, and in differentiation from, other elements of language and
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enough, then, for the property claimant to say simply, "It's mine"
through some act or gesture; in order for the "statement" to have
any force, some relevant world must understand the claim it makes
and take that claim seriously.
Thus, in defining the acts of possession that make up a claim
to property, the law not only rewards the author of the "text"; it
also puts an imprimatur on a particular symbolic system and on
the audience that uses this system. Audiences that do not under-
stand or accept the symbols are out of luck. For Pierson's dissent-
ing judge, who would have made the definition of first possession
depend on a decision of hunters, the rule of first possession would
have put the force of law behind the mores of a particular sub-
group. The majority's "clear act" rule undoubtedly referred to a
wider audience and a more widely shared set of symbols. But even
under the majority's rule, the definition of first possession de-
pended on a particular audience and its chosen symbolic context;
some audiences win, others lose.
In the history of American territorial expansion, a pointed ex-
ample of the choice among audiences made by the common law
occurred when one group did not play the approved language game
and refused to get into the business of publishing or reading the
accepted texts about property. The result was one of the most ar-
resting decisions of the early American republic: Johnson v. McIn-
tosh,4 9 a John Marshall opinion concerning the validity of opposing
claims to land in what is now a large part of Illinois and Indiana.
The plaintiffs in this case claimed through Indian tribes, on the
basis of deeds made out in the 1770's; the defendants claimed
under titles that came from the United States50 The Court found
for the defendants, holding that the claims through the Indians
were invalid, for reasons derived largely from international law
rather than from the law of first possession. But tucked away in
the case was a first-possession argument that Marshall passed over.
The Indians, according to an argument of the claimants from the
United States, could not have passed title to the opposing side's
predecessors because, "[b]y the law of nature," the Indians them-
selves had never done acts on the land sufficient to establish prop-
erty in it. That is to say, the Indians had never" really undertaken
texts).
41 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
50 The United States' claims came through Virginia, which had ceded its western lands
to the United States after the Revolutionary War. Id. at 559.
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those acts of possession that give rise to a property right. 1
Although Marshall based his decision on other grounds,
52
there was indeed something to the argument from the point of
view of the common law of first possession. Insofar as the Indian
tribes moved from place to place, they left few traces to indicate
that they claimed the land (if indeed they did make such claims).5 3
From an eighteenth-century political economist's point of view, the
results were horrifying. What seemed to be the absence of distinct
claims to land among the Indians merely invited disputes, which in
turn meant constant disruption of productive activity and dissipa-
tion of energy in warfare. Uncertainty as to claims also meant that
no one would make any productive use of the land because there is
little incentive to plant when there is no reasonable assurance that
one will be in possession of the land at harvest time. 4 From this
classical economic perspective, the Indians' alleged indifference to
well-defined property lines in land was part and parcel of what
seemed to be their relatively unproductive use of the earth.55
51 Id. at 569-70.
52 Id. at 588 ("We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, mer-
chants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the
territory they possess . . . . Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot
deny .... ").
53 See infra note 55 and accompanying text. It should be noted that even at the time of
English settlement, a number of eastern tribes did farm and live in villages, some with sub-
stantial structures. See R.C. SIMMONS, THE AMERICAN COLONmS FROM SETTLEMENT TO INDE-
PENDENCE 156 (1976) (Iroquois villages were protected by log palisades, with crops outside;
southeastern tribes generally lived in farming and hunting villages); WILLIAM CRONON,
CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 56 (1983)
(New England Indians grew crops; their crop areas were the only lands recognized as Indian
property by English settlers).
See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION pt. 1, ch. 10, at 118 (R. Hildreth trans.
1864) (1st ed. Paris 1802) (lack of security of property in the North American interior re-
sults in warring tribes and lack of civil improvements; security of property in European
settlements results in growing cities, cultivation, roads, wealthier and much more numerous
populace); see also J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 37, at 335-36 (comparing the unproductive
character of "the wild woods and uncultivated wast [sic] of America left to Nature" with the
enclosed and improved lands of Devonshire); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *7:
[W]ho would be at the pains of tilling [the soil], if another might watch an opportunity
to seise upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labour? Had not therefore
a separate property in lands, as well as moveables, been vested in some individuals, the
world must have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which,
according to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature.
William Cronon, supra note 53, at 53, 56-57, argues that the lack of fixed improvements on
Indian land gave European settlers an excuse for dispossessing them, though some settlers
argued that Indian practices of burning the forests prior to hunting sufficed to establish a
property claim.
51 See supra note 54. From the perspective of a hunting people, however, definite prop-
erty in land may seem undesirable and indeed may cause insecurity. A recent example is the
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Now it may well be that North American Indian tribes were
not so indifferent to marking out landed property as eighteenth-
century European commentators supposed. Or it may be that at
least some tribes found landed property less important to their se-
curity than other forms of property and thus felt no need to assert
claims to property in land.56 But however anachronistic the John-
son parties' (ultimately mooted) argument may now seem, it is a
particularly striking example of the relativity of the "text" of pos-
session to the interpretative community for that text. It is doubtful
whether the claims of any nomadic population could ever meet the
common law requirements for establishing property in land.
57
Thus, the audience presupposed by the common law of first pos-
session is an agrarian or a commercial people-a people whose ac-
tivities with respect to the objects around them require an une-
quivocal delineation of lasting control so that those objects can be
managed and traded.5
But perhaps the deepest aspect of the common law text of
possession lies in the attitude that this text strikes with respect to
the relationship between human beings and nature. At least some
Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of owning the land.
Indeed they prided themselves on not marking the land but rather
on moving lightly through it, living with the land and with its crea-
tures as members of the same family rather than as strangers who
visited only to conquer the objects of nature.5 9 The doctrine of first
series of complicated land settlements that have arisen under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (1982). Some Native American corporations
have objected to selection of specific lands as tribal property because they think this may
prevent them from following the migratory herds that supply their livelihood. See Parfit,
Alaska's Natives Are Bringing Off the Biggest Corporate Takeover, SMITHSONIAN MAG.,
Aug. 1981, at 30; cf. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PROC.
347, 351-53 (1967) (scarcity of animals may lead to establishment of property rights among
hunting populations, so that individual hunters husband animals in alloted areas; this thesis
is applicable, however, only to the hunting of animals that do not roam widely).
56 But see R.C. SIMMONS, supra note 53, at 156 (some eastern tribes settled in villages).
67 This argument was made by the Johnson defendants, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 569-70.
18 Marxists would doubtless see in these common law property doctrines still further
proof of the relationship of ideas to economic substructure. The law of first possession-the
rule that a clear and visible demarcation of a claim should confer some right-would be seen
as just another item in the intellectual baggage of capitalist production.
5 This attitude is reflected in a letter from an elderly Indian chief to President Frank-
lin Pierce in 1855, described in C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 15 (1977). After
stating that the Indians did not see the land as something to be owned, the letter went on:
"We know that white man does not understand our ways[,] . . . for he is a stranger who
comes in the night and takes from the land whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother
but his enemy, and when he has conquered it he moves on." See also Silko, They Were the
Land's, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1980, § 7 (Book Review), at 10, col. 1 (describing sense of
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possession, quite to the contrary, reflects the attitude that human
beings are outsiders to nature. It gives the earth and its creatures
over to those who mark them so clearly as to transform them, so
that no one else will mistake them for unsubdued nature.6 0
We may admire nature and enjoy wildness, but those senti-
ments find little resonance in the doctrine of first possession. Its
texts are those of cultivation, manufacture, and development. We
cannot have our fish both loose and fast, as Melville might have
sdid,61 and the common law of first possession makes a choice. The
common law gives preference to those who convince the world that
they have caught the fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to
useful labor, but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific
vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood
by a commercial people. It is this commonly understood and
shared set of symbols that gives significance and form to what
might seem the quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that
one has, by "possession," separated for oneself property from the
great commons of unowned things.
kinship between Indian tribes and the land).
80 For the longstanding European history of aversion to unsubdued nature, see
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND ch. 1 (rev. ed. 1973).
61 HERMAN MELVILLE, MoB' DICK ch. 89 ("Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish") (1st ed. London
1851). This chapter describes some litigation over ownership of a whale that had been
harpooned but got away, harpoon and all, only to be harpooned and taken by a second crew.
The legal question involved the point at which the whale stopped being a "loose-fish" and
became a "fast-fish"-that is, the point at which the whale became someone's property.
Melville goes on to describe a number of items (including serfs and mortgages) as "fast-fish"
and a number of other items (America at Columbus' arrival, ideas, the rights of man) as
"loose-fish."
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